Qaradawi, the “Arab Spring” and The Treason of the Intellectuals

Friday February 18, 2011 marked the triumphal return to Cairo of Muslim Brotherhood “Spiritual Guide” Yusuf al-Qaradawi. After years of exile, his public re-emergence in Egypt was sanctioned by the nation’s provisional military rulers. 1 Qaradawi’s own words were accompanied by images and actions during his appearance which should have shattered the delusive view that the turmoil leading to President Mubarak’s resignation augured the emergence of a modern, democratic Egyptian society devoted to Western conceptions of individual liberty, and equality before the law.

Egyptian cleric Safwat Higazi could be seen prominently behind al-Qaradawi for the duration of the latter’s speech. Recently Higazi, during his Arabic-language program “Age of Glory,” broadcast on the Egyptian al-Nas satellite television network, issued an unabashed call for aggressive violent, jihad. He quoted a hadith from ‘Ali, the son-in-law of the Muslim prophet Muhammad and Islam’s fourth “Rightly Guided” caliph, in which ‘Ali tells his sons: “Go, fight, and please your grandfather [i.e. Muhammad]. Let him be pleased with you. Fighting is what pleases the prophet (peace be upon him).” Higazi also urged jihadists, graphically, when attacking non-Muslim infidels to “Strike and split the head, and cut it in half.” 2 Equally plain are Higazi’s goals for  this brutal jihadism—the re-creation of a transnational Muslim Caliphate: 3

I am convinced that Islam is imminent, the caliphate is imminent. One of these days, the United States of Islam will be established. Allah willing, it will be soon. Egypt will be one state in this [United States of Islam.] Morocco and Saudi Arabia will be states as well.

And of course the requisite accompaniment to Higazi’s jihadism would be a jihad genocide of Israeli Jews, as described in other media pronouncements the cleric has made, such as, 4 “Dispatch Those Sons of Apes [Koran 2:65; 7:166] and Pigs[Koran 5:60 5] to the Hellfire,” and 6 “Yes, I Am an Antisemite; If Not for the Arab Rulers, We Would Devour the Jews with Our Teeth.”

Contrast the prominence afforded Higazi, with the treatment of Google executive Wael Ghonim.  Upheld by a fawning Western media 7 as the putative embodiment of Egypt’s “democracy uprising,” Ghonim was forcibly barred from the platform where Qaradawi spoke in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. According to an Al-Arabiya report, 8

Ghonim tried to take the stage in Tahrir, but men who appeared to be guarding Qaradawi barred him from doing so. Ghonim, who was angered by the episode, then left the square with his face hidden by an Egyptian flag.

But notwithstanding MEMRI, 9 and my colleague Al-Mutarjim (whose translation follows), no mainstream media outlets have reported that Qaradawi himself issued a clarion call for the jihad re-conquest of Al-Aqsa mosque, i.e., Jerusalem. This pronouncement, made during his Tahrir Square Friday “khutbah”, or sermon,  was met with thunderous applause. 10

A message to our brothers in Palestine: I have hope that Almighty Allah, as I have been pleased with the victory in Egypt, that He will also please me with the conquest of the al-Aqsa Mosque, to prepare the way for me to preach in the al-Aqsa Mosque. May Allah prepare the way for us to (preach) in the al-Aqsa Mosque in safety—not in fear, not in haste. May Allah achieve this clear conquest for us. O sons of Palestine, I am confident that you will be victorious.

The media’s egregious omission was hardly accidental. Qaradawi’s statement immediately following this deleted jihad rallying cry—about having the Egyptian Army open the Rafah border crossing into Gaza 11 to facilitate “delivering aid to our brethren” 12—was widely reported. The deliberate omission of Qaradawi’s bellicose incitement to re-capture Jerusalem reflects a larger, sustained campaign by both the mainstream media, and the warped pseudo-academics whom they choose, selectively, to provide their background information. The poisonous fruit of this incestuous relationship has been a concerted effort to characterize as “pluralist, reform Islam” Qaradawi’s obscurantist, albeit mainstream Islamic Weltanschauung of Sharia (Islamic Law)-based, aggressive jihadism, and its corollary—virulent Jew, and other infidel hatred.

John Esposito, who heads the lavishly Saudi-funded (i.e., 20 million dollars donated in 2005, according to the New York Times 13) Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University, is the doyen of American academic apologists for jihadism. Esposito, despite being a distressingly shallow and transparent strumpet for the House of Saud, who nonetheless continues to proffer geostrategic “advice” on the Muslim world to the American government, opined in a fall 2003 Boston Review essay 14 that Qaradawi embodied a,  “…reformist interpretation of Islam and its relationship to democracy, pluralism and human rights.”

Nearly a decade later, Esposito’s distorted, malignant assessment of Qaradawi has become standard fare regurgitated by both the mainstream media, and the next generation of Esposito-like pseudo-academics these journalists seek out for comment. Witness the New York Times coverage 15 of Qaradawi’s Tahrir Square oration. Consistent with the unchallenged Esposito-indoctrinated narrative, we are told that the cleric’s speech,16  “…struck themes of democracy and pluralism, long hallmarks of his writing and preaching.” This assertion is followed by a reiteration that “[s]cholars”—doubtless, of Esposito’s ilk— 17 “…who have studied his work say Sheik Qaradawi has long argued that Islamic law supports the idea of a pluralistic, multiparty, civil democracy.”  But then the rather witless Times reporter stumbles when he clumsily invokes his selected “academic Qaradawi expert,” Notre Dame Professor Imad Shahin. Acknowledging that Qaradawi has openly endorsed violence against both Israeli Jews, and American troops in Iraq, Shahin, unmasking his own jihadist mindset, stated, 18“You call it violence; I call it resistance.” Earlier at Qaradawi’s own website, Islam Online, Professor Shahin decried 19 as the “dismantling of Islam… tearing Islam apart from within,” the suggestion that Islam’s Sharia-based “hadd” punishments might be abrogated. Shahin argued that these punishments were intrinsic and essential to Islam, concluding, 20

The marginalization of certain aspects of Shari`ah can have grave consequences in the future…Should Shari`ah be twisted to suit societal behavior or should it be the guide for it? 

What are the so-called “hadd” punishments condoned by Shahin, and the “pluralistic” modernist he champions, Qaradawi? Defined by the Muslim prophet Muhammad either in the Koran, or the hadith (the canonical collections of Muhammad’s deeds and pronouncements), these draconian punishments include: 21 (lethal) stoning for adultery; death for apostasy; death for highway robbery, when accompanied by murder of the robbery victim; for simple highway robbery, the loss of hands and feet; for simple theft, cutting off of the right hand; for “fornication,” a hundred lashes; for drinking wine, eighty lashes. Muhammad Abu Zahra (d. 1974), was a prominent member of Al-Azhar’s Academy of Islamic Research, Professor of Islamic Law at Cairo University, and prolific author. These extracts from Abu Zahra’s “Punishment in Islam,” featured in the seminal 935 pp. Proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the Academy of Islamic Research, September 1968, provide the mainstream institutional Islamic context for the contemporary views expressed by Shahin and Qaradawi: 22*

The hadd punishments being prescribed for the protection of society, their execution is tantamount to an act of worship and equivalent to a holy war [jihad] in the cause of Allah. To purge the community of pernicious elements is a sort of holy war to safeguard religion and morals…From the words of Ibn Taymiya 22a it appears that Hudud are prescribed as a divine blessing. This idea is further developed by al-Mawardi in his ‘al-Ahkam al-Sultaniya’. 22b [Mawardi writes] “Hadd punishments are imposed by Allah as [a] deterrent from his prohibitions and the omission of His commandments.”

An unusually frank observation by Shadi Hamid of Brookings Institute’s Doha Center, Qatar, published in the 2/18/11 Christian Science Monitor report of Qaradawi’s speech, captured the Muslim Brotherhood “Spiritual Guide’s” appeal to the Egyptian masses. 23

Qaradawi is very much in the mainstream of Egyptian society, he’s in the religious mainstream, he’s not offering something that’s particularly distinctive or radical in the context of Egypt… He’s an Islamist and he’s part of the Brotherhood school of thought, but his appeal goes beyond the Islamist spectrum, and in that sense he’s not just an Islamist figure, he’s an Egyptian figure with a national profile.

Yet even this more honest assessment 24 omits any of the ubiquitous concrete examples of Qaradawi’s odious vision, articulated, repeatedly in the clerics own words.

During two recent interviews (from 2/9/06, 25 and 9/25/08 26) published at the Muslim Brotherhood’s English website “IkhwanWeb,” Qaradawi elucidated his overarching beliefs and goals. He extolled the putative “moderate vision” of MB founder and paragon, Hassan al-Banna. 27 Qaradawi lauds al-Banna’s “approach” as representing, 28

…balance and integration, as it adopts a propagative educational methodology which  includes the development of the Muslim individual, family, community, state, and nation, as it seeks to liberate and unite the Islamic  nation.

Qaradawi further promoted the notion that the MB govern Egypt, while expressing his personal desire to be a spiritual guide for the entire Egyptian nation, not merely the MB. He also espoused the direct political expression of Islam as articulated by the MB. 29

One can be content with his role of calling for Islam if he finds that the political duties have been taken care of and that people’s needs are being met, but if this is absent then it becomes everyone’s duty to take on the political role.

Qaradawi concludes 30 with an ostensible call for “freedom and democracy,” but only as a vehicle for the imposition of Sharia—the standard modern era jihadist formulation, “Islamic State through the will of the people.”

A vast array of readily available fatwas, sermons, and interviews put ugly flesh on the structural bones of Qaradawi’s Weltanschauung as articulated in the 2/9/06, 31 and 9/25/08 32 IkhwanWeb postings. As salient examples, Qaradawi has publicly advocated all of the following:


  • That Muslims emulate their prophet Muhammad as a model for violent, expansionist jihad, which includes the sanctioning of so-called jihad “martyrdom operations” 33
  • The re-creation of a formal transnational United Islamic State (Islamic Caliphate) 34
  • The jihad conquests of Europe 35 and the Americas 36
  • Universal application of the Sharia, including Islamic blasphemy law, 37 and the hadd punishments (for example, notably, executing so-called “apostates” from Islam 38)
  • Homicide “martyrdom” bombings of all Israeli Jews, including non-combatants, and subsequently, invoking Hitler and expanding the circle of hatred, a call for the frank jihad genocide of all Jews (“This was divine punishment for them. Allah willing, the next time will be at the hand of the believers.”) Qaradawi also expressed a personal longing to die in a homicidal “martyrdom” operation targeting Jews: “I’d like to say that the only thing I hope for is that as my life approaches its end, Allah will give me an opportunity to go to the land of Jihad and resistance, even if in a wheelchair. I will shoot Allah’s enemies, the Jews, and they will throw a bomb at me, and thus, I will seal my life with martyrdom. Praise be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds. Allah’s mercy and blessings upon you.”) 39
  • Contextualizing his superficial message of “brotherhood” towards Egypt’s Coptic Christians in the 2/18/11 Tahrir Square speech, 40 he issued a fatwa 41 prohibiting Southern Sudanese Muslims from joining the Christian Southern Sudanese majority in voting to peacefully secede from the brutally discriminatory Sharia state government of the Arab Muslim Khartoum regime

Julien Benda 42 in his classic 1928 La Trahison des Clercs (The Treason of the Intellectuals) decried with prophetic accuracy how the abandonment of objective truth abetted totalitarian ideologies, which lead to the cataclysmic destruction of World War II. 43 La Trahison des Clercs, or  The Treason of the Intellectuals of our time remains the nearly complete failure of Western intellectuals to study, understand, or acknowledge the heinous consequences of the living, corollary Islamic institutions of jihad war, 44 and Jew/infidel hatred. 45

Perhaps even more fittingly, Victor Klemperer, a Dresden University Literature Professor of Jewish descent, recorded the following apposite diary entry on August 16, 1936 in  “I Will Bear Witness,” his chronicle documenting the horrific brutality of daily life under Nazi tyranny: 46

If one day the situation were reversed and the fate of the vanquished lay in my hands, then I would let all the ordinary folk go and even some of the leaders, who might perhaps after all have had honorable intentions and not known what they were doing. But I would have all the intellectuals strung up, and the professors three feet higher than the rest; they would be left hanging from the lamp posts for as long as was compatible with hygiene.

Returning to our own era, as late as August, 2011, Fouad Ajami, while hectoring Barack Obama’s reticence to champion the Arab Spring “democrats,” gushed: 47

This was the Arabs’ 1989, their supreme moment of historical agency, a time when younger people broke with their culture’s history of evasion and scapegoating. For once the “Arab Street” was not gripped by anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism, for once it wasn’t looking beyond its geography for alien demons.

Ajami’s delusive assessment notwithstanding, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi’s February 18, 2011 Tahrir Square appearance foreshadowed events that transpired, predictably, during the subsequent ten months, punctuated by the open ascendancy of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology, and party affiliates, across North Africa, and the entire Middle East. 47a  Indeed, Qaradawi’s triumphant February 18th “khutbah”, or sermon to the adoring Muslim throngs that day was symbolic of an Islamic revival begun by the so-called “Al-Manar modernists”—Jamal Al-Din Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Muhammad Rashid Rida 48–more than a century before he took the stage at Tahrir Square.

Two Orientalist scholars of Islam, Dr. Charles C. Adams, 49 and the great Ignaz Goldziher, 50 studied the Al Manar modernists (named after the periodical, “Al Manar”, [“The Lighthouse”], founded by Rashid Rida as the mouthpiece for the propagation of his mentor, Muhammad Abduh’s, doctrine 51), in real time, as their contemporaries. (For example, Goldziher met Afghani in Cairo during 1873/74 52). Adams’ “Islam and Modernism in Egypt,”—originally completed as part of his PhD thesis in 1928 (published in 1933)—includes extensive biographical and historical material on Afghani, Abduh, and Rida, as well as considerable discussion of their doctrines. 53 Ignaz Goldziher (d. 1921) is still regarded as the preeminent Orientalist scholar  of Islam (a giant among giants in the era prior to cultural relativism), and a highly sympathetic, albeit honest observer of the creed. 54 Goldziher analyzed the doctrines of the Al Manar reformers in his 1920 study on Koranic exegesis, “Schools of Koranic Commentators,” specifically, the concluding chapter, “Islamic Modernism and the Interpretation of the Koran.” 55

Believing in the “perfection” of Islam, based upon its supposed adherence to “reason,” and the contrasting “imperfection” of all inferior belief systems, or even “impure” Islamic practices, Afghani (d. 1897), for example, in his “Refutation of the Materialists” (translated by his student, Abduh), taught that, 56

 …[T]he minds of the people should be purified of belief in superstitions and foolish notions. Islam requires this, especially because the doctrine of the Unity of God requires the clarifying of the mind and forbids such foolish and extravagant notions as idolatry, or incarnations and suffering of the deity…[T]he articles of belief of the religion of the nation [i.e., Islam] should be the first subject taught to the people, and this should be done by teaching also the proper reason and arguments in support of these beliefs of the people should not rest upon mere acceptance of authoritative teaching (taqlid)…Islam made possible perfection for all. It is not like Brahmanism which divides men into castes, the limits of which cannot be overstepped. Nor like Judaism, which despised men of other religions and instituted within itself the priesthood as the caste nearest to God…Islam is almost alone among the religions of the world in addressing itself to man’s reason, and demanding that he should accept religious belief only upon the grounds of convincing argument and not of mere claim and supposition

Paradoxically, in light of its putatively self-evident “reasonableness,” but of course, consistent with other totalitarian ideologies, pre-modern and modern alike, this inherent reasonableness and superiority of Islam—“the only religion by which the happiness of nations can be attained” 57— must be made plain to the masses in each nation by, 58

…a special class whose function would be the education of the rest of the people, and another class whose function would be the training of the people in morals. One class would combat natural ignorance and the need of instruction, the other would combat the natural passions and the need of discipline. These two provisions, the teacher to perform the work of instruction, and the disciplinarian to command that which is good, and to prohibit that which should be avoided, are among the most important provisions of Islam.

Afghani’s devoted pupil Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) the “modernist”  was  a Sharia-supremacist, i.e., jihadist, by any objective (i.e., scholarly) standard. Here are his own words from the last decade of the 19th century: 59

The religion of Islam is the one bond which unites Muslims of all countries…Its Divine Law (Shariah) regulates in detail the rights and duties of all, both ruler and subjects… It is s duty incumbent upon all Muslims to aid in maintaining the authority of Islam and Islamic rule over all lands that have once been Muslims; and they are not permitted under any circumstances to be peaceable and conciliatory towards any who contend the mastery with them, until they obtain complete authority without sharing it with any one else…The only cure for these [Muslim] nations is to return to the rules of their religion [Islam] and the practice of its requirements according to what it was in the beginning, in the days of the early Caliphs…Muslims must learn to help one another and stand against all foes…I urge that the supreme authority over all should be the Koran, and the aspect in which they are united should be their religion

Goldziher’s 1920 analysis of the al-Manar modernists is redolent with unapologetic insights. The clarity and validity Goldziher’s assessment have been confimed with the passage of time, and at present, are of even more urgent importance. Elucidating the theology of these so-called modernists, whose writings not infrequently quoted for support the medieval “fundamentalist” Hanbali jurists Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and his pupil Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350), while making clear its absence of any “conciliatory” impetus vis a vis non-Muslims, Goldziher provided this definition—“cultural Wahhabism” [emphasis added]—as a final characterization. 60

Readers of Islamic theological history of literature will readily note that the ideas guiding the struggle of the party of al-Manar against the prevalent theology, and the general religious spirit derived from it, obviously reflect the influence of Ibn Taymiyya and his pupil Ibn  Qayyim al-Jawziyya (14th century AD), whose latent result was the Wahhabi movement. Both reject the madhab [separate schools of Islamic law] institution and its requirement of taqlid [authoritative teacing]; both strive for the return to the sunnah, and its exclusive guide in religious affairs; and both violently oppose bidah [innovation], and particularly aim at the prohibition of the veneration of saints and relics and its related superstitions. Al-Manar incessantly offers examples of this influence which, even if not the initial impulse towards opposition to the prevalent orthodoxy, but in any case strongly contributed to the theological foundation of this point of view. Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn  Qayyim al-Jawziyya are the religious leaders deserving the title shaykh al-Islam. In al-Manar are to be found quotations from these theologians as supporting evidence, but also extensive passages from their published and unpublished works for one’s benefit and for the theological edification of its readers. It is Ibn  Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s I’lam al-muwaqqain [Ilaam ul Muwaqqieen an Rabb il Aalameen; “Advice for Those Who Write on Behalf of the Lord of the Worlds” 61] to which particular reference is made in the question of ijtihad [logical deduction on theology by a learned Muslim scholar] and the decisions of legal cases…The Egyptian [al-Manar] movement…operates under the aspect of theology. It derives its reformative demands from theological considerations free of alien influence. It insists on the redress of abuses, not so much because they  are hostile to culture, but because they are hostile to Islam, and contrary to the Koran and the authentic tradition. Abuses based on ostensible hadiths are rebuked by the means of the criticism of hadith as applied in Islamic sciences. In most cases this is sufficient for the struggle against the prevalent religious conditions, which the leaders of this movement brand as the prime evil, guilty for the decline of Islam.

…The cultivation of natural sciences (and its related technical sciences) has for Islam also an eminent practical purpose, closely related to the political position of Islam. This Muhammad Abduh teaches [in his Koranic exegesis] with reference to [Koran] 3:200: “O believers, be patient, and vie you in patience; be steadfast; fear God; happily so you will prosper.” And [Koran] 8:60-62: “And if you fearest treachery any way at the hands of a people, dissolve it with them equally; …make ready for them whatever force and strings of horses you can, to terrify thereby the enemy of God and your enemy, and others besides them that you know not.” This means that according to the rules of Islam [quoting Abduh] “the unbelievers must be fought with the same weapons that they use in fighting Islam. This means that in our time we must compete with them in the production of cannons, rifles, sea and air armaments, and other war material. All this makes it incumbent on Muslims to achieve perfection in technical and natural sciences, because this alone will lead to military readiness.”

…[T]hey attach importance to the preservation of their individual character as Muslims and Orientals, and despise the thoughtless and servile imitation of European manners, warning their co-religionists of their disadvantages and harm. They continuously and vigorously endeavor to stress the Arabic Basis of Islam and want to keep everything that is beneficial, retaining all the Oriental idiosyncracies which are reconcilable with their theological theory. But we cannot—as it has been done recently—call their ideology a conciliatory theology. For such a role they are too radical regarding abuses. A more appropriate definition might be cultural Wahhabism…The struggle of these “cultural Wahhabis” deserves our interest….[emphasis added]

Goldziher further observed that Abduh had praised the Najdi (Arabian) Wahhabi iconclasts as advocates for true Islam in  violently confronting bidah [innovation], while he reproved the mid-19th century Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali for attacking the Wahhabis. 62 Confirming Ignaz Goldziher’s prescient characterization (from 1920) of the entire al-Manar movement, Abduh’s “co-modernist” pupil and promoter, Rashid Rida (d. 1935) evolved into a full-throated, public supporter of the political aspirations of Ibn Saud’s Wahhabism, most clearly manifest in a pro-Wahhabi tract Rida wrote entitled, “The Wahhabis and the Hijaz” 63

Consisting of a series of articles originally published in al-Manar, and Egyptian newspapers, during the Hashemite-Saudi conflict, Rashid Rida’s apologetic for Ibn Saud, “The Wahhabis and Hijaz” sought to vindicate Wahhabism’s reputation, and champion the Saudi-Wahhabi side in the struggle for control of Islam’s holy places in the Hijaz. Rida maintained that with the end of the Ottoman era, and formal dismantling of the Caliphate, the Wahhabis, despite misgivings about them, were renowned for their pious adherence to Islam and hostility to foreign influence. In contrast, Rida argued, their adversaries, the Hashemites under Sharif Husayn, were notorious for plotting with Islam’s enemies for the sake of personal ambitions.  Rida asserted that a devout, powerful Muslim ruler, such as Wahhabi potentate Ibn Saud, unlike the seditious Husayn (and his sons), would be a bulwark against the realization of Britain’s desire to “eradicate” Islam as a political force and, eventually, even as a religious doctrine and belief system. 64 As David Commins observed in his 2006, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, 65

The notion that ambitious western powers worked hand in hand with duplicitous Arab rulers to advance western interests and to crush Islam would become a pillar of Muslim revivalist discourses…The apprehension of a sinister alliance between voracious foreign powers and corrupt local rulers figures prominently in the outlook of the contemporary Muslim revivalist movements. The oldest and most influential such movement is the Muslim Brothers, founded in Egypt in 1928 by a twenty-two year old schoolteacher, Hasan al-Banna…

Professor Johannes J.G. Jansen, a leading contemporary scholar of Islam, re-affirmed Goldziher’s seminal assessment of the “Manar modernists”, and also highlighted the direct nexus between Rashid Rida, and Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna. 66 Jansen translated Rida’s Koranic commentary on verse 5:44, an interpretation consistent with the (anti-Mongol) war theology of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and the classical Koranic commentary of Ibn Kathir (d. 1373). 67  According to Rida’s gloss on Koran 5:44, 67 the verse is directed at

…whomsoever thinks it is distasteful to rule in accordance with the just rules which Allah sent down, and does not rule by them because he holds different views, or because he has worldly interests. According to these verses, they are the [apostate] unbelievers; because true faith requires obedience. Obedience requires deeds, and is not consistent with dislike [of the rules of Sharia] and omitting [to apply them].

As Jansen noted in 1997, 68

In the twentieth century this fragment is recited daily, from Indonesia to Morocco, to affirm one’s lack of faith in present day rulers and their regimes.

What Rida emphasized, Jansen adds, was 69

…that Koranic punishments or hudud [or hadd, i.e., according to the Sharia, the acts of unlawful sexual intercourse, false accusation of unlawful sexual intercourse, drinking wine, theft and highway robbery, as well as unrepentant apostasy, are punishable by flogging, limb amputation, or death] cannot be abolished [emphasis added] by governments which feel they do not belong in the twentieth century.

Rida’s discourse both rationalized and embodied the yearning of the Muslim masses for a return to mainstream Islamic orthodoxy—in his era, and ours. Thus Jansen observes, regarding the draconian, Sharia-mandated hudud punishments  70

Public opinion in the modern Muslim world attaches importance to these Koranic punishments…When the Koranic punishments are carried out, and especially when the authorities take care that they are carried out in public, many Muslims see this as a sure sign that Islam finally has its way…

Jansen concludes his analysis of the Manar modernists—their own legacy, and direct linkage to Hasan al-Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood movement—with this apt, if unromantic appraisal: 71

In retrospect it is evident that Rida shared these popular feelings about the Koranic punishments. Moreover, he appears to have subscribed to the radical view that condemns modern heads of state in the Arab world as apostates from Islam, and it is difficult today, to see why an earlier generation of orientalists [note: but certainly not Goldziher!] regarded Al-Afghani, Abduh, and Rida as modernizing, westernizing liberals. The desire for the return of the glory of Islam, which these three reformers felt so strongly, and the particular socio-political circumstances in which they lived made them not [emphasis in original] into liberal modernizers but into the founding fathers of Islamic fundamentalism. In October 1941 the Egyptian government suppressed Al-Manar, which a certain Hasan al-Banna had recently taken over from the heirs of Rashid Rida [d. 1935]. It is with Hasan al-Banna that professional violence became part and parcel of the movement we now call Islamic fundamentalism.

Charles Wendell introduced his elegant 1978 translation of five Al-Banna treatises with a brilliant and remarkably compendious assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood founder’s Weltanschauung. Wendell stressed not only Al-Banna’s seamless connection to the Al-Manar modernists, but to traditional Islam itself. Moreover, Wendell’s concluding observations remain critical to understanding the deep Islamic religious animus towards Israel—so much in evidence today—that Al-Banna and his movement both inspired, and reflected. 72

One impressive factor that immediately strikes any student of the movement [the Muslim Brotherhood] is that it represents a continuation of the activist Pan-Islamic doctrine of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and the early Muhammad Abduh…[I]t seems beyond dispute that, like Al-Afghani, he [Al-Banna] has as his final goal a return to the world-state of the Four Orthodox Caliphs (Al-Khalafa al-Rashidun) and, this once accomplished an aggressive march forward to conquer the rest of the earth for God and his Sacred Law… Like most of the Muslim reformers from the early nineteenth century on, Al-Banna believed that it was possible top pick and choose those aspects of Western civilization he could accept as compatible with Islamic doctrine and morality, and neatly excise the rest… Hasan, like his heroes like Al-Afghani and M[uhammad] Abduh, castigated the clerics for their withdrawal from the real world around them. Their fixation on gloss-writing, and their abdication of their true responsibilities as spiritual guides and models…Hasan’s answer to this was essentially that of both the fundamentalist Hanbalites and the “Manar” modernists, especially Abdhu’s disciple Muhammad Rashid Rida, whom he admired more than Abduh himself: “Back to the Qur’an and the Sunna!”… Hasan al-Banna’s fundamental conviction that Islam does not accept, or even tolerate, a separation of “church” and state, or of either from society, is as thoroughly Islamic as it can be. Any attempt to translate his movement into terms reducible to social, political, or religious factors exclusively simply misses the boat. The “totality” created by the Prophet Muhammad in the Medinese state, the first Islamic state, was Hasan’s unwavering ideal, and the ideal of all Muslim thinkers before him, including the idle dreamers in the mosque. His ideology then, before it was Egyptian or Arab or whatever, was Islamic to the core. Since it embraced all aspects of human life and thought, it was at least as much religious as anything else. Practically all of his arguments are shored up by frequent quotations from the Qur’an and the Traditions, quite in the style of his medieval forbears. If one considers the public to whom his writings were  addressed, it becomes instantly apparent that such arguments must still be the most compelling for the vast bulk of the Muslim populations of today. The nagging feeling that Islam must, and very quickly at that, catch up with the West, had even by his time filtered down from above to the masses after having been the watchword of the modernizing intellectual for almost a century. There was also the notion that all these Western sciences and techniques were originally adopted from Islamic culture, and were therefore merely “coming home”—a piece of self-conscious back-patting that was already a cliché of most Muslim political writing… To this [Islamic] revivalist mentality, nothing could be more hateful than further diminution of the lands traditionally dominated by Islam. I believe that much of the fury and unconcealed hatred of the Zionist state which is expressed by the majority of Arabs will become more comprehensible in light of what the Islamic domain as a concept really means to the Muslims, seen through the lens of Hasan’s exposition. Fascists were unable to endow their acts or beliefs with a religious dimension, except for the embarrassing juvenility of the Teutonic shrines reputedly raised in Germany. In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, however, they had, on the basis of indisputable historical facts and clear religious traditions, a ready-made program for a world crusade that required only actors and a leader. Islam had from the beginning been a proselytizing faith. The error of the Islamic peoples, as Al-Afghani had pointed out forty years before, had been to cease their inexorable forward march, to abnegate their God-ordained destiny…

Nadav Safran’s 1961 study 73 of modern Egyptian political evolution through 1952, confirmed that already by the late 1930s, Egypt’s inchoate experimentation with a Western cultural orientation and constitutional polity, had failed miserably, and the authentic Islamic ideals of the Al Manar modernists and al-Banna, were prevailing. He provided this summary of the predominant attitudes by then: 73a

…[R]eawakened hostility against Britain for violating Egypt’s national rights, and deep resentment for its support of the foundation of Israel…The Muslim orientation had become predominant, and the opposition to the Western culture on the ideological level had become nearly total, even though in practice imitation of the surface aspects of that culture remained…

Two decades later, Olivier Carre’s 1983 analysis of the profound regional impact of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood since the 1950s, described what he termed, aptly, as “a striking phenomenon”, which pervaded the Arab Muslim Near East: 73b

[W]hen one discusses Islam, as one often does in terms of a social and political ideal, whether out of religious conviction or because it is in the news, a common language, a sort of conceptual koine [a lingua franca, or widely used language] is found in all Eastern Arab countries—in Muslim schoolbooks, in the speech or behavior of people, whether friends or casual acquaintances, or in press reports on various current events. This common language is derived, ultimately, from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood of the Nasserist period and also from what I shall call the “new Muslim Brothers” of the 1970s and 1980s…

Carre concluded with this prescient observation, borne out most recently and dramatically  by the unfolding events of the so-called “Arab Spring”; 74

[W]e shall eventually come to speak of a Saudi-inspired and directed neo-Ottomanist utopia, socially based on the middle classes of the Arab East, which is not particularly “new” except by virtue of an acculturation drive. Its militant basis will be Islamic politico-religious groupings of which the new Muslim Brothers is the most significant group…

Three decades after Carre wrote these words, 75 the steady, inexorable advance of this dominant Muslim Brotherhood ideology (and discourse) is clearly evident, most recently, in the North African “Arab Spring” coups, 76  followed by popular electoral victories in Tunisia, 77 and Morocco, 78 with the Muslim Brotherhood already gaining 79 a large plurality in the first 79a of pending rounds of Egyptian elections, which will extend into 2012. Vote tallies  released Sunday, December 4, 2011 by Egypt’s High Election Commission 79b  revealed the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice party garnered 36.6% of the ballots cast, followed by the hardline Salafist Nour party with 24.4% (i.e., another Islamic fundamentalist coalition, allied with Al-Qaeda font Gemaa Islamiyya 79c), and a third fundamentalist party, the Wasat party received 4.3%. These results indicate a resounding 65% of the votes went to Islamic fundamentalist parties. 79c1 In stark contrast, the “secular and moderate”  Egyptian Bloc garnered only 13.4% of the vote. 79c2 Thus, as summarized on December 2, 2011 by Al Ahram, the combined Muslim Brotherhood-“Salafist” bloc was poised to capture some 120 out of the 168, or 70%, of the Parliamentary seats contested in this initial phase of the elections. 79d Contra the witless, agenda-driven pre-election assessments by mainstream media—such as the gullibly reported estimate by NY Times correspondent David Kirkpatrick that the Muslim Brotherhood would receive only 10% of the vote 79e—Hudson Institute analyst, Samuel Tadros accurately forecasted a fundamentalist “tsunami.” 79f Tadros described the most salient, if gloomy results of the actual balloting, as follows: 79g

In nearly every single district in Egypt with the exception of a few in Cairo, the Muslim Brotherhood came in first place, followed by the Salafists’ Islamic Alliance. The gap between both groups and the rest of the parties is humongous… The Egyptian Bloc performed relatively well, but that is simply a reflection of Christian votes. There is a clear correlation between the bloc’s numbers and the number of Christians in a district. In districts with high Christian concentration, such as Asyut and Cairo and Alexandria, they managed to win a number of seats; in places with no Christians, such as Damietta, they received 9,000 votes out of 274,000 cast.

The Egyptian voting results are entirely concordant with recent public opinion polling data which demonstrated that at least 60 percent of Egyptians have “fundamentalist”, i.e., traditional, mainstream Islamic views, while just 20 percent are secular in orientation. 79h For example, regarding two traditional, if draconian, Sharia-based hadd punishments, 84 percent of Egyptians favored killing “apostates” who forsake Islam, and 77 percent agreed that thieves should have their hands amputated. 79i

This trend has been accompanied by tragic, if predictable outcomes, consistent with all earlier “Islamic revival” movements of the ancient, pre-modern, and modern eras. 80 Thus the Muslim masses from the three main “protagonists” of the Arab Spring drama, i.e., Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and regionally throughout the Middle East, by their words and deeds, are promoting strict (or “stricter”) application of the Sharia, 81 while engaging in overt violence, or violent threats against the region’s non-Muslim religious minorities, specifically, Christians and Jews. 82 Egypt’s Copts have been pogromed, and their churches demolished, 83 and even the silent, vestigial remnant dhimmi Jewish communities of North Africa, 84 attacked. For example, in Tunisia, a temple was firebombed, 85 and in Libya, a lone Jew of Libyan descent, delusively ignoring a millennium of Islamic Jew-hatred which pogromed the native Jewish population out of existence, 86 returned to help his “Libyan Muslim brothers” of the National Transitional Council, but was forced to flee for his life by Muslim mobs apparently enraged by his expressed desire to restore a synagogue. 86a And a sine qua non of all the Arab Spring uprisings, since their advent, has been venomous Jew-hatred directed at Israel, with frank calls for a jihad genocide of Israeli Jews. 87 Lastly, an ugly epiphenomenon, pathognomonic of the Islamic misogyny unleashed by the Arab Spring, has been the repeated episodes of rape of women foreign reporters attempting to cover the unfolding events. 88

Written over 13 years ago, Bat Ye’or’s  analysis of “enlightened Muslim moderates” and their terrible failings, merits careful reconsideration. Her unflinching appraisal from the perspective of a great scholar who grew up among them, as a non-Muslim, indeed a Jew, is that these “Muslim reformers” completely squandered opportunities for genuine reform at the end of the European colonial era. She describes  an attitude of utter denial by Muslims, even much ballyhooed “liberals” and “moderates,” which still applies, with the rarest of isolated exceptions. The consequences of this willful, callous blindness are equally apparent in the current triumph of mainstream Islamic, Muslim Brotherhood-dominated “Arab Spring” uprisings, accompanied by a burgeoning litany of abuses of indigenous and foreign non-Muslim religious minorities, as well as foreign women reporters, and indigenous Muslim women: 89

It is this lack of testimony that has brought back the evils and the prejudices of the past—the jihad mentality, and the laws of dhimmitude that were only abolished by the colonial European powers. And now, more and more, because of this lack of testimony, we see moderate Muslims themselves being persecuted. Because they were indifferent to the humiliation of Jews and Christians, because they remained silent and aloof, they now find themselves—in Algeria, Egypt, and elsewhere—suffering from cruel injustices and barbarism. Testifying together, giving testimony against dhimmitude, would have allowed Muslim intellectuals to rethink their whole relationship with the People of the Bible—and with all non-Muslims, and this without renouncing their faith. Such an attitude would have brought all of us together in the fight against tyrannical oppression, against the process of dehumanization. This is what could have been done and what was not done.

The largely ignored anti-Christian violence and persecution wrought by the Islamic resurgence animating Egypt’s “Arab Spring” was brought to the fore during a November 12, 2011 Republican Presidential candidates foreign policy debate in South Carolina. Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, responding to a question about Egypt, frankly acknowledged, and condemned this ugly phenomenon, stating: 90

Candidly, the degree to which the Arab spring may become an anti-Christian spring is something which bothers me a great deal. And I would certainly have the State Department intervening on behalf of the Coptic Christians, who are being persecuted under the new system, having their churches burned, having people killed. And I’d be pretty insistent that we are not going to be supportive of a regime which is explicitly hostile to religions other than Islam.

Finally, Egyptian expatriate author and essayist, Nonie Darwish, raised a Muslim in Cairo, and educated at the American University there, offered this wistful, sobering perspective on the tragic, ongoing failure of imagination painfully evident a year after Qaradawi’s triumphant “Arab Spring”  Tahrir Square “khutba”: 91

I dreamed and still dream of a real Arab Spring, where the majority of the people will stand behind an enlightened leader at Tahrir Square in a magical moment of truthful courage and say, “We need to change course and to change ourselves. What we suffer from is not imposed on us by Mubarak, but by Islam controlling the state and the legal system, and this must end. It is time for the snake of Sharia to retreat back to Mecca, so that we can liberate beautiful Egypt, Persia, and the rest of the Middle East from this Arabian cultural curse.” If Muslim nations reject such an enlightened leader and continue to seek an Islamic Ummah, then the future of stability and peace in the Islamic world will be grim indeed.



1. David D. Kirkpatrick. “After Long Exile, Sunni Cleric Takes Role in Egypt”, The New York Times, February 18, 2011

{ }

2. Al-Mutarjim. “Islamists Say Be ‘Cutters of Necks’; Sex With Prepubescent Girls Okay”, Big, Januray 19, 2011 { }

3. “Egyptian Cleric Safwat Higazi Unveils His Vision: The United States of Islam”, The Middle East Media Research Institute, January 18, 2009, Clip No. 2043 { }

4. “Egyptian Cleric Safwat Higazi on Hamas TV: Dispatch Those Sons of Apes and Pigs to the Hellfire, on the Wings of Qassam rockets”, The Middle East Media Research Institute, Clip No. 1972

Al-Aqsa TV (Hamas/Gaza) – December 31, 2008 { }

5. 2:65 { }

Arberry translation: “And well you know there were those among you that transgressed the Sabbath, and We said to them, ‘Be you apes, miserably slinking!’ ”

7:166 { }

Arberry translation: “And when they turned in disdain from that forbidding We said to them, ‘Be you apes, miserably slinking!’”

5:60 { }

“Say: ‘Shall I tell you of a recompense with God, worse than that? Whomsoever God has cursed, and with whom He is wroth, and made some of them apes and swine, and worshippers of idols — they are worse situated, and have gone further astray from the right way.’ ”

6. “Egyptian Cleric Safwat Higazi Responds to MEMRI: Yes, I Am an Anti-Semite; If Not for the Arab Rulers, We Would Devour the Jews with Our Teeth”, The Middle East Media Research Institute, Clip #1983
Al-Nas TV (Egypt), January 4, 2009 { }

7. Andrew Bostom. “Wael Ghonim Deserves the Spring Time for Sharia in Araby Award”,, May 24, 2011.{ } As I noted then:


Wael Ghonim, Google’s head of marketing for the Middle East and North Africa was presented Monday 5/23/11 (Jessica Alpert, “Wael Ghonim Accepts ‘Profile In Courage’ Award For Egyptian People”, Radio Boston, May 23, 2001{ }) with one of the 2011 “Profiles in Courage” awards  by the John F. Kennedy Library. Ghonim was honored for his purported role in sparking the Egyptian uprising via the use of social media, which forced President Mubarak to resign…But the Kennedy Library “Profiles in Courage” award recipient Wael Ghonim apparently has no such regrets about the ascension of the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite being barred from the stage at Tahrir Square on February 18th during Muslim Brotherhood Spiritual Guide Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s triumphant return, and sermon, Ghonim tweeted, “I loved Sheikh Qaradawi Khutbah [sermon] today. Was truly inspired when he said: ‘Today I’m going to address both Muslims and Christians.’ ”


Ghonim only reinforced his disturbing lack of concern about, if not outright support for the totalitarian, Sharia-based agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood when interviewed by a fawning NPR reporter on the occasion of his  “Profiles in Courage” award. Ghonim states plainly, “I have met a lot of the people planning to run for Parliament. Some of them are from the Muslim Brotherhood movement. It seems to me that all are sharing the same dream.” Subsequently the NPR reporter asks two important related questions. Ghonim’s responses clarify in alarming ways his tacit acceptance of, and perhaps even active support for an Egypt openly aligned with Iran and Hamas, and run by the Muslim Brotherhood. Interviewer: “Do you worry that…the Muslim Brotherhood which is very well organized and had a big role in the September elections that are paving the way for the Parliamentary elections…Do you worry  the Muslim Brotherhood…will co-opt your revolution?” Ghonim: “Whomever comes in power based on a democratic process should be empowered and lead the country. I disagree with those who want to get people scared of the Muslim Brotherhood.” Interviewer: “What would you say to Westerners who might be concerned about the direction Egypt is going in…some leaders looking to normalize relations with Iran, relaxing blockage of the Gaza strip, brokering a deal with Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, and then I mentioned the Muslim Brotherhood. What would you say to those concerned that a new Egypt might be moving away from the West?” Ghonim: “I don’t like this attitude of Fatherhood, where the West needs to be happy with what happens in Egypt.”


8. “Egypt military says will not allow strikes to go on”, Al Arabiya, February 18, 2011

{ }

9. “Leading Sunni Scholar Sheik Yousuf Al-Qaradhawi Calls for the Egyptian Army to Replace the Government and Prays to Allah for the Conquest of the Al-Aqsa Mosque”,  The Middle East Media Research Institute, Clip # 2815, February 18, 2011 { }

10. Al-Mutarjim. “Al-Qaradawi Leads Friday Prayers in Cairo, Prays for the Conquest of Jerusalem”, Translating Jihad, February 19, 2011 { }

11. See for example, Dan Murphy. “Egypt revolution unfinished, Qaradawi tells Tahrir masses”, The Christian Science Monitor, February 18, 2011.{ }

12. See full text of Qaradawi’s  February 18, 2011Tahrir Square speech. Al-Mutarjim. “Exclusive: Transcript of Qaradawi’s Speech in Cairo”, Translating Jihad, March 7,  2011. {}

See also the full translation by Dr. Yahya Michot, a professor at the Hartford Seminary, reproduced here:

{} Originally posted at Islam Online as :{ Satellite?c=Article_C& pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs/ MAELayout&cid=1156077826744 }

13. Karen W. Arenson. “Saudi Prince Gives Millions to Harvard and Georgetown”, The New York Times, December 13, 2005 { }

14. John Esposito. “Practice and Theory—A response to ‘Islam and the Challenge of Democracy’”

Originally published in the April/May 2003 issue of Boston Review

{ }

15. “After Long Exile, Sunni Cleric Takes Role in Egypt”

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Dina Abdel-Mageed. “Tariq Ramadan’s Call for a Moratorium—Storm in a Teacup”,, April 18, 2005  { } Originally posted at Islam Online as :

{ Satellite?c=Article_C& pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs/ MAELayout&cid=1156077826744 }

20. Ibid.

21. Thomas Patrick Hughes. A Dictionary of Islam, London, 1885, p. 153.

22. Muhammad Abu Zahra. “Punishment in Islam,” in Proceedings of The Fourth Conference of the Academy of Islamic Research, September, 1968, Cairo, 1970, p. 755. *quote expanded slightly from original essay.

22a. Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) was a Syrian theologian and jurisconsult of the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence under the Mamluks, who lived in Damascus. His writings inspired the so-called Islamic modernists of the late 19th through early 20th century, such as Al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida, as well as the earlier 18th century Wahhabi revival movement.

22c. Al-Mawardi (d. 1058) was a famous jurist of the Shafiite school of Islamic jurisprudence, who resided in Baghdad. He authored an important legal treatise, Al-akham as-Sultaniyya, which included seminal observations on the Muslim ruling institution of the Caliphate, as well as a treatise on morality.

23. “Egypt revolution unfinished, Qaradawi tells Tahrir masses”,

24. Ibid.

25. “Qaradawi: “MB asked me to be a chairman’ ”,, Interview conducted 2/9/2006

{ }

26. “Qaradawi: ‘Muslim Brotherhood Represents Moderate Islam, Best Group in Muslim Nation’ ”,, Interview conducted 9/25/2008

{ }

27. Richard P Mitchell. The Society of the Muslim Brothers, London, Oxford University Press, 1969.;

Hasan al-Banna. Translated by Charles Wendell. Five tracts of Hasan al-Banna a selection from the Majmu at Rasa’il al-Imȧm al-Shahi̇d Ḥasan al-Banna, Berkeley, CA, 1978.; Brynjar Lia. The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt—The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928-1942, Reading, UK, 1998.

28. “Qaradawi: ‘Muslim Brotherhood Represents Moderate Islam, Best Group in Muslim Nation’ ”

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.; See also,  for example, Emmanuel Sivan, “Eavesdropping on Radical Islam”, Middle East Quarterly
March 1995, pp. 13-24  {}:


Realities have a way of shaping positions. Hence the appearance of catchphrases as launched in Algeria, “Islamic state through the will of the people” (dawla Islamiya bi-iradat ash-shab). FIS leader Rabah Kbir, now in exile in Germany, elaborated upon this slogan (in a sermon recorded in Oran in October 1991) but was ambiguous over whether it means a plurality of parties would be maintained under an Islamic state. He was likewise opaque about accepting the principle of alternating governments. “God may deploy stratagems of deception against His enemies,” he remarked.


31. “Qaradawi: “MB asked me to be a chairman’ ”

32. “Qaradawi: ‘Muslim Brotherhood Represents Moderate Islam, Best Group in Muslim Nation’ ”

33. “The Prophet Muhammad as a Jihad Model”, The Middle East Media Research Institute, July 26, 2001, Special Dispatch No.246. { }

34.  Alexander Smoltczyk. “Islam’s Spiritual ‘Dear Abby’—The Voice of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood”, Spiegel Online, February 15, 2011 {,1518,745526,00.html }

35. Andrew Bostom. “Jihad in Europe: Past as Prologue?”,, February 20, 2006

{ }

36. Andrew Bostom. “Jihad terrorism in London”, The American Thinker, July 8, 2005

{ }

37. “Sheikh Al-Qaradhawi Responds to Cartoons of Prophet Muhammad: Whoever is Angered and Does Not Rage in Anger is a Jackass – We are Not a Nation of Jackasses”, The Middle East Media Research Institute, February 9, 2006, Special Dispatch No.1089 { }

38. See, Ask the Scholar, “Source of the Punishment of Apostasy,”, 7/23/2003. In a later article by Qaradawi, (Dr. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, “Apostasy: Major and Minor,”, April 13, 2006), he again emphasizes that the Islamic scholarly consensus upholding the death penalty for apostates, including the citation of Koran 2:217. { } Fatwas moved to

{ }


39. “Sheikh Yousuf Al-Qaradhawi: Allah Imposed Hitler On the Jews to Punish Them – ‘Allah Willing, the Next Time Will Be at the Hand of the Believers’ ”, The Middle East Media Research Institute, February 3, 2009, Special Dispatch No. 2224 { }

40. “After Long Exile, Sunni Cleric Takes Role in Egypt”

41. “Fatwa Against Sudan Muslims Voting for Separation”,; Fatwa issued 12/26/2010

{ }

42. Julien Benda (1867-1956) { }

43. Julien Benda. La Trahison des Clercs, Paris, 1927.

44. Andrew Bostom. The Legacy of Jihad, Amherst, NY, 2005/2008.

45. Andrew Bostom. The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism, Amherst, NY, 2008.

46. Victor Klemperer. I Will Bear Witness: 1933-1941, New York, 1998,  p. 184, Diary entry, August 16, 1936.

47. Fouad Ajami. “Barack Obama the Pessimist”, The Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2011


47a. Egypt:

Andrew Bostom. “Egypt: ‘Lost,’ or Found?”, Human Events, February 3, 2011 {}; Andrew Bostom. “Lara Logan’s Rape and Egyptian Muslim Jew-Hatred”,, February 17, 2011  {}; Andrew Bostom. “What the ‘Arab Spring’ has Sprung”, The American Thinker Blog, April 1, 2011

{}; Andrew Bostom. “Lara Logan: ‘They (Egyptian Democracy Advocates) Raped Me With Their Hands’ ”, April 29, 2011 {}; Andrew Bostom. “The Muslim Brotherhood on ‘Sheikh’ Bin Laden’s Killing: A Re-Affirmation of Shared Goals”, The American Thinker Blog, May 3, 2011 {}; Andrew Bostom. “Egyptian Democrats: ‘The victory of our revolution will not be complete without the liberation of Palestine’ ”, The American Thinker Blog, May 13, 2011  {}; Andrew Bostom. “Kennedy Library’s Springtime for Sharia Award”,  The American Thinker Blog, May 24, 2011

{}; Andrew Bostom. “Egyptian Islamo-Nazism and ‘Omar Amin’ Von Leers”,, May 30, 2011 {}; Andrew Bostom. “Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Dismantling Mubarak’s State for a Sharia State”, The American Thinker Blog, June 1, 2011 {}; Andrew Bostom. “Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Democrats to Form ‘Perfect Slavery to Allah’ Party”, The American Thinker Blog, June 9, 2011 {}; Andrew Bostom. “Totten: Eyeless in Zabibah-stan, Egypt”,, July 15, 2011 {}; Andrew Bostom. “Educating Charles Krauthammer on the Copts and Egyptian Islam”, The American Thinker Blog, October 12, 2011 {}; Andrew Bostom. “Coptic Church Construction and Egyptian Muslim ‘Emasculation’ ”, The American Thinker Blog, October 15, 2011 {}; Raymond Ibrahim. “Egypt’s Massacre of Christians: What the Media Does Not Want You To Know”, Hudson, October 31, 2011 {}; Andrew Bostom. “Egypt: More Evidence on How Islam Liberates Women”, The American Thinker Blog, November 18, 2011


Peter Hitchens. “The overthrow of Egypt’s despotic ruler was hailed a success but nine months on, Peter Hitchens reports on a fearful and violent land”, The Daily, November 20, 2011

{}; Diana West. “Would You Want Your Daughter Reporting in Tahrir Square?” Diana, November 26, 2011{}; Oren Kessler. “Muslim Brotherhood rally vows to ‘kill all Jews’ ”, The Jerusalem Post, November 27, 2011{}; Ulrike Putz. “The Muslim Brotherhood Prepares for Power”, Der Spiegel Online, November 28, 2011 {,1518,druck-800338,00.html}; David D. Kirkpatrick. “After Second Day of Voting in Egypt, Islamists Offer Challenge to Generals”, The New York Times, November 29, 2011 {}



“The Libyan ‘Not Worthy Zone’—Recalling Qadaffi’s ‘Offer’ to ‘Arab Jews’ ”,, March 3, 2011 {}; Andrew Bostom. “Libya: Bombing to Support Jew-Hating Jihadists?”,, March 30, 2011{}; Andrew Bostom. “Libyan ‘Freedom Fighters’ Murderous Jihad Against Non-Arab Blacks”, The American Thinker Blog, May 27, 2011 {}; Andrew Bostom. “Libya Made Safe for Sharia?”, The American Thinker Blog, August 22, 2011

{}; Andrew Bostom. “The New Libyan Zabibah-stan: Made Safe for Sharia?”,, August 22, 2011 {}; Andrew Bostom. “Popeye Knew the Libyan Rebels”,, August 26, 2011

{}; Laura Rozen. “Menacing Libyan crowd forces returned Libyan Jew to flee Tripoli synagogue”, Yahoo, Oct 4, 2011 {};

Andrew Bostom. “Liberated Libya: Al Qaeda Flag Aloft Benghazi’s Courthouse”, The American Thinker Blog,

October 29, 2011 {}; “Libya’s Muslim Brothers Emerge From the Shadows”, Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, Volume IX, Issue 43, November 24, 2011, pp. 2-4 {}



Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu. “Gangs in Tunisia Burn Torah Scroll, Set Synagogue on Fire”, Israel National,

February 2, 2011 {}; Andrew Bostom. “Spring Time for Qaradawi in Kairwan?”,, April 1, 2011 {}; Andrew Bostom. “The ‘Arab Spring’ explains itself further”, The American Thinker Blog, July 3, 2011

{}; Andrew Bostom. “ ‘Liberated’ Tunisia: 40% Plurality to Mainstream Sharia-Promoting Ennahda Party”, The American Thinker Blog, October 24, 2011 {}; Andrew Bostom. “The Jihadist Vision of Tunisia’s New ‘Democratic’ Leader”, The American Thinker Blog, October 25, 2011 {}; Andrew Bostom. “A 2006 Taqiyya Warning About Tunisia’s Leading Candidate for Prime Minister”,, October 27, 2011 {}; Andrew Bostom. “ ‘Liberated’ Tunisia, the New Caliphate, and the Jihad Conquest of Jerusalem”, The American Thinker Blog, November 17, 2011  {};



“Islamists win most seats in Moroccan vote”, Reuters, November 27, 2011



Regional, Beyond North Africa:

[The Sudan] Andrew Bostom. “Ramping Up to Another Jihad Genocide in The Sudan?”,, June 20, 2011 {}

[Iraq] Andrew Bostom. “Post-Surge Iraq: 2010 ‘Worst Year’ for Christian Minority”,  The American Thinker Blog, July 17, 2011 {}

[Syria]  Andrew Bostom. “The ‘Good’ Revolt in Syria, or Just More Revolting Jihadists?”, The American Thinker Blog, September 18, 2011 {

_jihadists.html}; Bastian Berbne. “Syria’s Christians Side with Assad Out of Fear”, Der Spiegel Online, November 30, 2011{,1518,800450,00.html}

[Regional] Raymond Ibrahim. “Muslim Persecution of Christians: October, 2011”, Hudson, November 17, 2011{}; Dr. John Eibner. “Dear Mr. President, Today, Christian Solidarity International (CSI) issued a Genocide Warning concerning the 12 million-plus members of endangered non-Muslim minorities in North Africa and the broader Islamic Middle East.”, Christian Solidarity International, November 29, 2011{}


48. Ignaz Goldziher. Schools of Koranic Commentators, edited and translated by Wolfganag H. Behn, Wiesbaden, Germany, 2006. First published as Die Richtungen der Islamischen Koranaslegung, Leiden, 1920; Charles C. Adams. Islam and Modernism in Egypt, New York, 1933

49. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt

50. Goldziher, Schools of Koranic Commentators; Richard Gottheil. “Ignaz Goldziher” Journal of the American Oriental Society, 1922, Vol. 42, pp. 189-193

51. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, p. 177

52. Goldziher, Schools of Koranic Commentators, p. 204

53. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, pp. 4-247

54. Gottheil, “Ignaz Goldziher”

55. Goldziher, Schools of Koranic Commentators, pp. 197-232

56. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, pp. 15-16

57. Ibid, p. 16

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid, pp. 59-60

60. Goldziher, Schools of Koranic Commentators, pp. 203,204, 212, 213-214, 222-223

61. Alternative/variant translations: “Information for those Who Write on Behalf of the Lord of the Worlds”; “Informing the Signatories about the Lord of the Universe”

62. Goldziher, Schools of Koranic Commentators, p. 212

63. Rashid Rida. al-Wahhabiyun wa al-Hijaz [The Wahhabis and the Hijaz], Cairo,1926

64. David Commins. The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, London, 2006, pp. 138-140

65. Ibid, p. 140

66. Johannes J.G. Jansen. The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism, Ithaca, New York, 1997, pp. 38-40

67. Ibid, p. 38

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid, p. 39

70. Ibid, pp. 39-40

71. Ibid, p. 40

72. Hasan al-Banna. Translated by Charles Wendell. Five tracts of Hasan al-Banna a selection from the Majmu at Rasa’il al-Imȧm al-Shahi̇d Ḥasan al-Banna, Berkeley, CA, 1978, pp. 3-8.

73. Nadav Safran. Egypt in Search of Political Community—An Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt, 1804-1952, Cambridge, 1961.

73a. Ibid, pp. 209, 215

73b. Olivier Carre. “The Impact of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s Political Islam Since the 1950s”, p. 262, in Islam, Nationalism, and Radicalism in Egypt and The Sudan, edited by Gabriel R. Warburg and Uri M. Kupferschmidt, New York, 1983.

74. Ibid, p. 275.

75. Ibid.

76. Bostom, “Egypt: ‘Lost,’ or Found?”; “Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Dismantling Mubarak’s State for a Sharia State”; “Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Democrats to Form ‘Perfect Slavery to Allah’ Party”; “Egypt: More Evidence on How Islam Liberates Women”; Hitchens, “The overthrow of Egypt’s despotic ruler was hailed a success but nine months on, Peter Hitchens reports on a fearful and violent land”; Bostom, “The New Libyan Zabibah-stan: Made Safe for Sharia?”; “Liberated Libya: Al Qaeda Flag Aloft Benghazi’s Courthouse”; “Libya’s Muslim Brothers Emerge From the Shadows” [Jamestown Foundation]; Bostom. “The ‘Arab Spring’ explains itself further”; “The Jihadist Vision of Tunisia’s New ‘Democratic’ Leader”

77. Bostom, “ ‘Liberated’ Tunisia: 40% Plurality to Mainstream Sharia-Promoting Ennahda Party”

78. “Islamists win most seats in Moroccan vote”

79. “Egypt election results show Islamists are winning”, The Telegraph (London), December 3, 2011


79a. “Final results of first stage of parliamentary elections”, The Egyptian State Information Service, December 3, 2011 {}

79b. “Egypt’s Islamists Take Commanding Lead in Elections”, Voice of America News, December 04, 2011; See also these earlier reports: Michael Jansen. “Fundamentalists’ win confirms worst fears of Egypt’s secularists”, The Irish Times, December 3, 2011, {}; “Egypt election results show Islamists are winning”

79c. Holly Fletcher. “Jamaat al-Islamiyya [Gemaa Islamiyya]”, The Council on Foreign Relations, May 30, 2008

{}; Richard Spencer of The Telegraph (London) profiled former Egyptian Islamic Jihad member Aboud al-Zamour, now in the leadership council of Gemaa Islamiyya.


Mr Zumour spent 30 years in prison for the Sadat killing before being released after the revolution that toppled Mr Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak. He is now on the council of Gamaa Islamiya, another militant group previously responsible for numerous murderous attacks on tourists and civilian targets that has, like him, “gone straight.” He estimates it will win seven per cent of the seats in the parliament for which elections began this week.


Richard Spencer. “Aboud al-Zumour, Islamic Jihad mastermind of Sadat’s murder, comes in from the cold after Egypt election”, The Telegraph (London), December 3, 2011 {}

79c1. “Egypt’s Islamists Take Commanding Lead in Elections”

79c2. Ibid.

79d. Gamal Essam El-Din.  “Brotherhood’s FJP secures 40% of the vote in 1st round of Egypt’s elections”, Al Ahram Online, {–of-the-vote-in-st-round-.aspx}

79e. David D. Kirkpatrick. “Wired and Shrewd, Young Egyptians Guide Revolt”, The New York Times, February 9, 2011 {}

79f. Samuel Tadros. “What to Watch For in the Egyptian Elections”, The National Review Online, November 28, 2011 {}

79g. Samuel Tadros. “The Egyptian Elections: Analyzing the First Round”, The National Review Online, December 2, 2011{}

79h. Douglas E. Schoen. “Why the Muslim Brotherhood Will Win”,, February 10, 2011


79i. “Muslim Publics Divided on Hamas and Hezbollah—Most Embrace a Role for Islam in Politics”, Pew Research Center, December 2, 2010 {}

80. See multiple historical examples in Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity Under Islam, Cranberry, New Jersey, 1996, and Islam and Dhimmitude, Cranberry, New Jersey, 2001, as well as Andrew Bostom, The Legacy of Jihad, Amherst, New York, 2005/2008, and The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism, Amherst, New York, 2008

81. Bostom, “Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Dismantling Mubarak’s State for a Sharia State”; “Egypt: More Evidence on How Islam Liberates Women”; Hitchens, “The overthrow of Egypt’s despotic ruler was hailed a success but nine months on, Peter Hitchens reports on a fearful and violent land”; Bostom, “The New Libyan Zabibah-stan: Made Safe for Sharia?”; “ ‘Liberated’ Tunisia: 40% Plurality to Mainstream Sharia-Promoting Ennahda Party”

82. Bostom, “Egyptian Islamo-Nazism and ‘Omar Amin’ Von Leers”; “Lara Logan’s Rape and Egyptian Muslim Jew-Hatred”; “The Libyan ‘Not Worthy Zone’—Recalling Qadaffi’s ‘Offer’ to ‘Arab Jews’ ”; “Libya: Bombing to Support Jew-Hating Jihadists?”; “Ramping Up to Another Jihad Genocide in The Sudan?”; “Post-Surge Iraq: 2010 ‘Worst Year’ for Christian Minority”; “The ‘Good’ Revolt in Syria, or Just More Revolting Jihadists?”; Berbne, “Syria’s Christians Side with Assad Out of Fear”; Ibrahim,  “Muslim Persecution of Christians: October, 2011”

83. Bostom, “Educating Charles Krauthammer on the Copts and Egyptian Islam”; “Coptic Church Construction and Egyptian Muslim ‘Emasculation’ ”; Ibrahim. “Egypt’s Massacre of Christians: What the Media Does Not Want You To Know”; Eibner, “Today, Christian Solidarity International (CSI) issued a Genocide Warning concerning the 12 million-plus members of endangered non-Muslim minorities in North Africa and the broader Islamic Middle East”

84. Andrew Bostom. “Recognition for the Silent Jewish Refugees”, The American Thinker, July 19, 2007


85. Gedalyahu, “Gangs in Tunisia Burn Torah Scroll, Set Synagogue on Fire”

86. Bostom, “The Libyan ‘Not Worthy Zone’—Recalling Qadaffi’s ‘Offer’ to ‘Arab Jews’ ”

86a. Rozen, “Menacing Libyan crowd forces returned Libyan Jew to flee Tripoli synagogue”

87. Bostom, “Egyptian Democrats: ‘The victory of our revolution will not be complete without the liberation of Palestine’ ”; ‘Liberated’ Tunisia, the New Caliphate, and the Jihad Conquest of Jerusalem”; Kessler, “Muslim Brotherhood rally vows to ‘kill all Jews’ ”

88. Bostom, “Lara Logan’s Rape and Egyptian Muslim Jew-Hatred”; “Lara Logan: ‘They (Egyptian Democracy Advocates) Raped Me With Their Hands’ ”; West, “Would You Want Your Daughter Reporting in Tahrir Square?”

89. Bat Ye’or. “Persecution of Jews and Christians: Testimony vs. Silence”, The Ethics and Public Policy Center, April 2, 1998 {}

90. Patrick Goodenough. “2012 Presidential Hopefuls Urged to Sign a ‘Pledge for Religious Freedom’ ”, November 30, 2011


91. Nonie Darwish. The Devil We Don’t Know: The Dark Side of the Revolutions in the Middle East, Hoboken, New Jersey, 2012, p. 224


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